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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Fifth Amendment 1 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, § 22 1 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B 6-511 1,4,7 
i i 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
• Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "[N]or shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
• Article I, §22, Utah Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." (Emphasis added). 
• UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511: 
The court, jury or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered 
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and assess: 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which 
will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by 
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein 
collectively as "Arby's") are the parties to the very case this Court intends to reconsider, 
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) (referred to herein 
as "Ivers I"). Following the recent trial in the Ivers case, Arby's filed a new appeal with 
the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Department of Transportation v. Ivers, Case No. 
20100511 -SC. The difficulties in applying Ivers I are what led to the outcome 
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necessitating a new appeal in Ivers. Because the Ivers case has now actually been tried 
under the law set down in Ivers I Arby's can provide additional insight and analysis 
concerning why the Ivers I ruling is problematic with respect to the distinction between 
view and visibility in determining severance damages. The Court's decision in the 
present matter is of great interest to Arby's and will have a direct impact on its pending 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Pursuant to the Court's June 23, 2010 Order for Supplemental Briefing and 
Rehearing in this matter, it appears the issue to be considered is whether the distinction in 
Ivers I between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a property owner's right to 
recover severance damages. 
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S ARGUMENT 
Arby's is filing this Amicus Brief in support of Admiral Beverage Corporation's 
position that the distinction between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a 
property owner's right to recover just compensation. Arby's does not dispute the 
appropriateness of the causation analysis of Ivers I which adopts the "essential" test. The 
causation analysis does not need to be reconsidered. 
After its long history in the appellate court system, the Ivers case was finally tried 
in Second District Court on April 13-15, 2010. Pursuant to this Court's mandate, the sole 
issue to be tried was the amount of severance damages relating to Arby's loss of view. 
The difficulties encountered in applying Ivers I at trial highlights the constitutional 
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problems with the ruling. The parties and the district court attempted to instruct the jury 
based upon their often inconsistent interpretations of Ivers I. The process was 
challenging, particularly when attempting to reconcile other well-settled principles of 
condemnation law. 
Additionally, over objection, UDOT's appraiser was permitted to base his 
professional opinion that Arby's had sustained no damage. This opinion is based in part 
on irrelevant and unsupported interviews of lay witnesses, such as managers of unrelated 
fast food restaurants. UDOT's appraiser was also permitted to testify that there is a 
distinction between properties where loss of view is compensable and where it is not 
compensable. In other words, he suggested to the jury that there are property types where 
an owner, such as Arby's, is not entitled to the constitutionally protected right of just 
compensation for damage caused to remnant property by an obstruction of view. 
According to this appraiser, compensation for loss of view would be reserved for things 
like high end resort properties with mountain views. 
Although this Court's mandate was for the trial court to determine Arby's 
damages, the jury ultimately awarded no severance damages to Arby's. The jury verdict 
was inconsistent with the undisputed fact that Arby's view had been damaged by UDOT's 
construction project. Arby's was denied just compensation under the application of Ivers 
I. 
Just compensation in a case involving a claim for severance damages is, and 
should be, based upon the diminution in fair market value of the remnant property. The 
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distinction in Ivers I between view and visibility is confusing, overly complex, and 
restricts the jury's consideration of factors required to fairly and fully value property and 
award appropriate severance damages. Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court's distinction 
between view and visibility should be overturned as an unconstitutional limitation on a 
property owner's right to recover severance damages. 
ARGUMENT 
Private property rights are protected by both the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. Both of these 
documents, which set the very foundations for state and federal law, prohibit the taking of 
property without just compensation. As thoroughly outlined in Admiral Beverage's 
Supplemental Brief, Utah's Constitution provides even broader protection than the United 
States Constitution by including language that property will not be damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 
Utah's condemnation statutes, which must be interpreted and applied consistent 
with the constitutional mandates, provide as follows with respect to severance damages: 
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence 
offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and 
determine and assess: 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only 
a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the 
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by 
the [condemning authority]. (Emphasis added). 
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UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511. 
Originally, Arby's claim for severance damages included claims that the value of 
its remnant property was damaged by UDOT's taking of a portion of Arby's property 
used to eliminate the traditional intersection at Shepard Lane and U.S. 89 in Farmington, 
Utah. Arby's property is located on the northwest corner of the former intersection at 
Shepard Lane and U.S. 89. Not only was direct access to Arby's remnant property 
eliminated, but, as this Court pointed out in Ivers /, the property's view and visibility 
were blocked by UDOT's elevation of U.S. 89 immediately east of Arby's remnant 
property. Ivers I, 154 P.3d at 804. Arby's journey through the appellate courts began 
when the trial court granted UDOT's motion in limine, precluding Arby's from presenting 
any evidence of severance damages to a jury. Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. 
Essentially, the Court of Appeals determined that because the portion of UDOT's 
construction project that interfered with Arby's property rights was not itself constructed 
on property taken from Arby's, causation for severance damages was not established. 
Ivers v. UDOT, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005). 
Following the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, the Utah Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, but only on the issue of whether loss of view and visibility are factors in 
awarding severance damages. In short, this Court was called upon to address the Court of 
Appeals' causation analysis and to determine whether loss of view and visibility are 
appropriately considered in connection with awarding severance damages. 
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With respect to causation, this Court properly rejected UDOTs assertion that in 
order to recover severance damages, the view-impairing structure must be built directly 
upon the severed land. Ivers /, 154 P.2d at 807. This Court held: 
When land is condemned as part of a single project - even if 
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other 
than that which was condemned - if the use of the condemned 
property is essential to the completion of the project as a 
whole, the property owner is entitled to severance damages. 
Id 
However, this Court went on to distinguish between view and visibility, and held 
there is no protected property right in visibility. Id. At 805-06. Therefore, Arby's was 
precluded from presenting evidence of claimed damage related to loss of visibility. Id. 
Not only will the Ivers I ruling impact other property owners seeking just 
compensation, such as Admiral Beverage, but the Ivers case itself has now been in the 
crucible of the trial court and the effect of the Supreme Court's holding can be evaluated 
under the light of actual experience. 
At trial, the parties and the district court attempted to prepare jury instructions that 
were consistent with Ivers I. However, the task was made difficult because of differing 
interpretations of the Ivers I ruling and because of other well-settled precedent that 
conflict with aspects of Ivers I. For example, other important condemnation cases that 
remain good law in Utah include Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 
(Utah 1974); Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987); Utah 
State Road Commission v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971); and others. 
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Additionally, well-settled law concerning how damages are calculated in 
condemnation cases remains intact following Ivers L These principles became confused 
in an attempt to follow Ivers L Compensation for severance damages is the difference in 
the fair market value of the owner's remaining property before and after the taking. See, 
e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saintsy 247 
P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952). This determination of fair market value can only be made by 
considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value. As this 
Court stated in Rohan, 
In making the appraisal, it is not only permissible but 
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a 
prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the 
facts, would take into account in arriving at its market value. 
487 P.2d at 859. 
As the actual trial proceedings in the Ivers case reveal, the long-standing principle 
set forth in Rohan must be ignored in order to apply the Ivers I holding that loss of view 
is considered, but loss of visibility is not. 
The jury instructions in the Ivers trial were essentially qualified to reflect this 
Court's restriction that only loss of view could be considered. Moreover, based upon 
Ivers I it was not clear whether a jury was tasked with providing a value for a specific 
property right that was damaged, i.e. view1, or whether view was a factor to consider 
under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511 for calculating severance damages, i.e., the 
Attempts to isolate and appraise separate items of damages were rejected by this Court 
inito/z^.487P.2dat859. 
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reduction in fair market value of the remnant property. For example, Jury Instruction No. 
31 informed the jury "The issues in this case include the value of the loss of view from 
[Arby's] property," indicating view was to be isolated and valued. (A copy of the Ivers 
Jury Instructions are attached hereto as Addendum "A"). Jury Instruction No. 33, 
contained the following caveat based upon Ivers I: "A property owner adjoining a public 
highway has no right to be viewed by passing traffic and is not entitled to any 
compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing traffic." (Emphasis 
added). In other words, despite being a factor sellers and buyers of real property would 
consider, the jury was not permitted to consider loss of visibility in determining Arby's 
damages. 
With respect to loss of view, Jury Instruction No. 34 provided "The loss of view is 
to be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway 
structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the property." This instruction was 
offered by Arby's in an attempt to reflect Miya. In Miya, this Court held the obstruction 
in that case was to be considered in determining severance damages. Specifically, 
severance damages were to be measured "by the effect the obstruction of view, created by 
the structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the unit of property." 526 P.2d 
at 929. However, the definition of market value was confusingly limited in Jury 
Instruction No. 36 as follows: "In this case you are to determine the fair market value of 
the loss of view from the defendants' property." (Emphasis added). Again, using Ivers I 
as guidance, jurors were told "just compensation includes the fair market value of the loss 
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of view from defendant's property." Addendum "A" at Jury Instruction No. 39. Under 
this instruction, jurors were required to isolate loss of view and place upon it a monetary 
value. 
With respect to computing damages generally, the jurors were told they had to 
"decide the value of the loss of view from the Defendants' property by determining the 
fair market value as of December 30, 2002. Id. at Jury Instruction No. 40. In short, not 
only were the Jury Instructions confusing, but jurors were given the impossible task of 
attempting to evaluate fair market value without considering all of the conditions caused 
by the elevated structure that buyers and sellers of real estate would take into account in 
valuing real property. The jury instructions were drafted pursuant to the parties' best 
efforts to comply with Ivers I. 
The problems with the Jury Instructions were exacerbated by the testimony 
UDOT's appraiser, Phillip Cook, was permitted to give at trial. Cook's opinion was that 
despite the view obstruction, there was absolutely no monetary impact. Prior to trial, 
Arby's attempted to restrict Cook's testimony through a motion in limine. (A copy of the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine is attached hereto as Addendum "B"). 
However, the district court denied the motion in limine and permitted Cook to testify that 
in his professional opinion, based in part upon testimony of lay witnesses, Arby's had 
sustained no damages as a result of UDOT's view-obstructing project. Cook's opinion 
was based upon such things as interviews with managers of unrelated fast-food 
restaurants who opined that view had no impact on their businesses. See, generally, 
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Addendum "B". At trial, Cook also advocated that a distinction can legitimately be made 
between categories of properties where damage to view is compensable and where it is 
not compensable. In connection with telling the jury that the loss of view had no impact 
on the value of Arby's remnant property, Cook took the position that view only has value 
for certain types of properties, such as resort hotels looking over the ocean, high end 
residential properties, office spaces with views of the Wasatch Mountains, and hotel 
rooms with views of the San Francisco Bay or the Golden Gate Bridge. (A copy of 
portions of Cook's trial testimony is attached hereto as Addendum "C"). In other words, 
according to UDOT and its appraiser, under Ivers I the constitutional rights are 
selectively applied. Just compensation is not afforded to everyone who has property 
damaged by a condemneds actions. UDOT was able to use the Ivers I decision to 
continue to deny just compensation to Arby's. Under Ivers /, Arby's property right was 
narrowly defined and marginalized, allowing the jury to buy in to UDOT's claim there 
was no damage. 
The type of segregation attempted at the Ivers trial is not appropriate. It prevents 
just compensation from being awarded to property owners because certain factors 
impacting value are disregarded and it opens the door to the type of testimony given by 
Phillip Cook that a property owner need not be compensated for loss of view, even when 
the causation element is satisfied. In Ivers, Arby's was awarded no severance damages 
for loss of view although it was undisputed the property's view has been obstructed. Zero 
damages does not qualify as just compensation for damaged property. 
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Arby's agrees with Admiral Beverage and submits the ruling in Ivers I is 
unconstitutional inasmuch as it interferes with the constitutional mandate of just 
compensation, as revealed by the results of the Ivers trial itself Attempting to isolate the 
issue of loss of view prevents a property owner from being made whole based upon a fair 
comparison of property value before and after the taking. See Utah State Road 
Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) ("just compensation means the 
owners must be put in as good as position money wise as they would have occupied had 
their property not been taken"). The distinction between loss of view and visibility 
resulted in a denial of Arby's constitutional rights. That result will be perpetuated in 
other cases if the decision is allowed to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Arby's, as Amicus Curiae, respectfully requests this 
Court overturn the portion of the Ivers I ruling that distinguishes between view and 
visibility as factors to be evaluated in determining severance damages. 
Respectfully submitted this Q day of September, 2010. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
INALD J. WINDER 
W. HOLT 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES IVERS; KATHERTNE G. HAVAS; 
and P AND F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant), 
Defendants. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 020700665 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
Ladies and Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one (1) through 
twenty-one (21), given to you at the beginning of the trial You will receive additional 
instructions at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your 
conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be carefully followed. 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Before the trial of this case begins, I need to give you some instructions to help you 
understand what you will see and hear. 
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff is the 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. The party who is being sued is called the 
defendant. In this case the defendants are JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE G. HA VAS, and P 
AND F FOOD SERVICES. 
The defendants seek damages for diminution of fair market value for loss of view 
resulting from the condemnation of their property and the construction of an elevated 
public highway. 
The plaintiff has already compensated the defendants for all other damages related to the 
condemnation of the defendants' property. 
2. GENERAL ADMONITIONS 
You have now been sworn as jurors in this case. I want to impress on you the seriousness 
of being a juror. You must come to the case without bias and attempt to reach a fair verdict based 
on the evidence and on the law. Before we begin, I need to explain how to conduct yourselves 
during the trial. 
Do not allow anything that happens outside this courtroom to affect your decision. During 
the trial do not talk about this case with anyone, including your family, friends, or even your 
fellow jurors until after I tell you that it is time for you to decide the case. When it is time to 
decide the case, you will meet in the jury room. You may discuss the case only in the jury room, 
at the end of the trial, when all of the jurors are present. After the trial is over and I have released 
you from the jury, you may discuss the case with anyone, but you are not required to do so. 
During the trial do not read about the case in the newspapers or on the internet or listen to 
radio or television broadcasts about the trial. If a headline or an announcement catches your 
attention, do not read or listen further. Media accounts may be inaccurate or may contain matters 
that are not evidence. 
You must decide this case based only on the evidence presented in this trial and the 
instructions that I provide. Do not investigate the case or conduct any experiments. Do not do any 
research on your own or as a group. Do not use dictionaries, the internet, or other reference 
materials. Do not contact anyone to assist you. Do not visit or view the scene of the events in this 
case. If you happen to pass by the scene do not stop or investigate. 
Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Evidence can only be presented one piece at a 
time. Do not form or express an opinion about the case while the trial is going on. You must not 
decide on a verdict until after you have heard all of the evidence and have discussed it thoroughly 
with your fellow jurors in your deliberations. 
Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your verdict. 
At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. 
You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. 
3. FURTHER ADMONITION ABOUT ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
Serious problems have been caused around the country by jurors using computer and 
electronic communication technology. It's natural that we want to investigate a case, or to share 
with others our thoughts about the trial, and it's easy to do so with the internet and instant 
communication devices or services, such as Blackberries, iPhones, Facebook, Twitter, and so on. 
However, please understand that the rules of evidence and procedure have developed over 
hundreds of years in order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The fairness of the entire 
system depends entirely on you, the jurors, reaching your decisions based on evidence presented 
to you in court, and not on other sources of information. You violate your oath as jurors if you 
conduct your own investigations or communicate about this trial with others. 
Jurors have caused serious consequences for themselves and the courts by "Googling" the 
parties, issues, or counsel; "Twittering" with friends about the trial; using Blackberries or 
iPhones to gather or send information on cases; posting trial updates on Facebook pages; using 
Wikipedia or other internet information sources, and so on. Even using something as seemingly 
innocent as "Google Maps" can result in a mistrial. 
Post-trial investigations are common and can disclose these improper activities. If they 
are discovered, they will be brought to my attention and the entire case might have to be retried, 
at substantial cost. 
Violations may also result in substantial penalties for the juror. 
So I must warn you again - do not use your cell phone or computer to investigate or 
discuss anything connected with this trial until it is completely finished. Do no interest research 
of any kind, and advise me if you learn of any juror who has done so. 
4. ROLE OF THE JUDGE, JURY AND LAWYERS 
You and I and the lawyers are all officers of the court, and we play important roles in the 
trial. 
It's my role to supervise the trial and to decide all legal questions, such as deciding 
objections to evidence and deciding the meaning of the law. I will also instruct you on the law 
that you must apply. 
It's your role to follow that law and to decide what the facts are. The facts generally relate 
to who, what, when, why, and how or how much. The facts must be supported by evidence. 
Neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case. That is your role. You should decide the case 
based upon the evidence presented in court and the instructions that I give you. 
It's the lawyers' role to present evidence, generally by calling and questioning witnesses 
and presenting exhibits. Each lawyer will also try to persuade you to decide the case in favor of 
his or her client. 
Things that you see on television and in the movies may not accurately reflect the way 
real trials should be conducted. Real trials should be conducted with professionalism, courtesy 
and civility. 
5. ORDER OF TRIAL 
The trial will generally proceed as follows: 
(1) Opening statements. The lawyers will make opening statements, outlining what the 
case is about and what they think the evidence will show. 
(2) Presentation of evidence. The defendants will offer evidence first, followed by the 
plaintiff. The parties may later offer more evidence, called rebuttal evidence, after hearing the 
witnesses and seeing the exhibits. 
(3) Instructions on the law. Throughout the trial and after the evidence has been fully 
presented, I will instruct you on the law that you must apply. You must obey these instructions. 
You are not allowed to reach decisions that go against the law. 
(4) Closing arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will 
share with you their views of the evidence, how is relates to the law and how they think you 
should decide the case. 
(5) Jury deliberations. The final step is for you to go to the jury room and discuss the case 
among yourselves until you reach a verdict. Your verdict must be based on the evidence 
presented in court and on my instructions on the law. I will give you more instructions about that 
step at a later time. 
6. SEQUENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS NOT SIGNIFICANT 
From time to time throughout the trial, I will instruct you on the law. The order in which I 
give the instructions has no significance. You must consider the instructions in their entirety, 
giving them all equal weight. I do not intend to emphasize any particular instruction, and neither 
should you. 
7. JURORS MUST FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS 
The instructions that I give you are the law, and your oath requires you to. follow my 
instructions even if you disagree with them. 
8. JURORS MAY NOT DECIDE BASED ON SYMPATHY, PASSION, AND 
PREJUDICE 
You must not decide this case for or against anyone because you feel sorry for anyone or 
angry at anyone. You must decide this case based on the facts and the law, without regard to 
sympathy, passion or prejudice.-
9. •• . NOTIi:-TAKING 
If you wish, you may take notes during the trial and have those notes with you when you 
discuss the case. We will provide you with writing materials if you need them. If you. take notes, 
do not over do it, and do not let your note-taking distract you from following the evidence, and 
you should use them only as a tool to aid your personal memory when it comes time to decide the 
case. 
1.0. RULES APPLICABLE TO RECESSES 
From time to time, I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break, 
overnight or longer. You will not be required to remain together while we are in recess. You 
must obey the following instructions during the recesses: 
Do not talk about this case with anyone - not family, friends or even each other. While 
you are in the courthouse, the clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so 
that people will not try to discuss the case with you. 
If anyone tries to discuss the case in your presence, despite your telling them not to, tell 
the clerk or the bailiff that you need to see me. If you must talk to me, do not discuss it with your 
fellow jurors. 
Although it is normal human tendency to talk with other people, do not talk or otherwise 
communicate with any of the parties or their lawyers or with any witness. By this, I mean do not 
talk with them at all, even to pass the time of day. 
Finally, do not make up your mind about what the verdict should be until after you have 
gone to the jury room to decide the case, and you and your fellow jurors have discussed the 
evidence. Keep an open mind until then. 
11. PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
When I tell you that a party has the burden of proof or that a party must prove something 
by a "preponderance of the evidence," I mean that the party must persuade you, by the evidence 
presented in court, that the fact is more likely to be true than not true. 
You may have heard that in a criminal case proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
I must emphasize to you that this is not a criminal case, hi a civil case such as this one, a 
different level of proof applies; proof by a preponderance of evidence. 
Another way of saying this is proof by the greater weight of the evidence, however slight. 
Weighing the evidence does not mean counting the number of witnesses nor the amount of 
testimony. Rather, it means evaluating the persuasive character of the evidence. In weighing the 
evidence, you should consider all of the evidence that applies to a fact, no matter which party 
presented it. The weight given to each piece of evidence is for you do decide. 
After weighing all of the evidence, if you decide that a fact is more likely true than not, 
then you must find that the fact has been proved. On the other hand, if you decide that the 
evidence regarding a fact is evenly balanced, then you must find that the fact has not been 
proved, and the party has therefore failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that fact. 
At the close of the trial, I will instruct you in more detail about the specific elements that 
must be proved. 
12. EVIDENCE 
"Evidence" is anything that tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact. It can be the 
testimony of a witness or documents or objects or photographs or stipulations or certain qualified 
opinions or any combination of these things. 
You must entirely disregard any evidence for which I sustain an objection and any 
evidence that I order to be struck. 
Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and you must 
entirely disregard it. Do not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make any 
personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view locations involved in the case, or 
inspect any things or articles not produced in court. Do not look things up on the internet. Do not 
look for information in books, dictionaries or public or private records that are not produced in 
court. Do not let anyone else do any of these things for you. 
Do not consider anything that you may have heard or read about this case in the media or 
byword of mouth or other out-of-court communication. 
The lawyers might stipulate to a fact or I might take judicial notice of a fact. Otherwise, 
what I say and what the lawyers say usually are not evidence. 
You are to consider only the evidence in the case, but you are not expected to abandon 
your common sense. You are permitted to interpret the evidence in light of your experience. 
13. DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
A fact may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence 
consists of facts or circumstances that allow someone to reasonably infer the truth of the facts to 
be proved. For example, if the fact to be proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry pie, and a 
witness testifies that she saw Johnny take a bite of the cherry pie, that is direct evidence of the 
fact. If the witness testifies that she saw Johnny with Cherries smeared on his face and an empty 
pie plate in his hand, that is circumstantial evidence of the fact. 
14. BELIEVABILITY OF WITNESSES 
Testimony in this case will be given under oath. You must evaluate the believability of 
that testimony. You may believe all or any part of the testimony of a witness. You may also 
believe one witness against many witnesses or many against one, in accordance with your honest 
convictions. In evaluating the testimony of a witness, you may want to consider the following: 
(1) Personal interest. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected one way 
or the other by any personal interest the witness has in the case? 
(2) Bias. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected by any bias or 
prejudice? 
(3) Demeanor. Is there anything about the witness's appearance, conduct or actions that 
causes you to give more or less weight to the testimony? 
(4) Consistency. How does that testimony tend to support or not support other believable 
evidence that is offered in the case? 
(5) Knowledge. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know what he or she is 
testifying about? 
(6) Memory. Does the witness's memory appear to be reliable? 
(7) Reasonableness. Is the testimony of the witness reasonable in light of human 
experience? 
These considerations are not intended to limit how you evaluate testimony. You are the 
ultimate judges of how to evaluate believability. 
15. INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
You may believe that a witness, on another occasion, made a statement inconsistent with 
that witness's testimony given here. That doesn't mean that you are required to disregard the 
testimony. It is for you to decide whether to believe the witness. 
16. EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY 
If you believe any witness has intentionally testified falsely about any important matter, 
you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, or you may disregard only intentionally 
false testimony. 
17. STIPULATIONS 
A stipulation is an agreement. Unless I instruct you otherwise, when the lawyers on both 
sides stipulate or agree to a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact 
as proved. The parties have stipulated to the following facts: 
a) The legal description of the property subject to this litigation; 
b) That the photograph of the subject property introduced into evidence by the 
defendants is an accurate representation of the subject property; and 
c) That the date of valuation is December 30,2002. 
Since the parties have agreed on these facts, you must accept them as true for purposes of 
this case. 
18. OBJECTIONS AND RULINGS ON EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE 
From time to time during the trial, I may have to make rulings on objections or motions 
made by the lawyers. Lawyers on each side of a case have a right to object when the other side 
offers evidence that the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not think less of a lawyer 
or a party because the lawyer makes objections. You should not conclude from any ruling or 
comment that I make that I have any opinion about the merits of the case or that I favor one side 
or the other. And if I sustain an objection to a question, you should not draw any conclusions 
from the question itself. 
During the trial I may have to confer with the lawyers out of your hearing about questions 
of law or procedure. Sometimes you may be excused from the courtroom for that same reason. I 
will try to limit these interruptions as much as possible, but you should remember the importance 
of the matter you are here to decide. Please be patient even though the case may seem to go 
slowly. 
19. STATEMENT OF OPINION 
Under limited circumstances, I will allow a witness to express an opinion. You do not 
have to believe an opinion, whether or not it comes from an expert witness. Consider opinion 
testimony as you would any other evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves. 
20. EXPERT WITNESS 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be received as 
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by 
education, study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling, 
may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, so long 
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the 
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it 
deserves. If you should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon 
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support 
of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may 
disregard the opinion entirely. 
21. CONFLICTING TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS 
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of J. Philip Cook and Jack Brown 
and Gary Free, you may compare and weight the opinion of one against that of another. In doing 
this, you may consider the qualifications and credibility of each, as well as the reasons of each 
opinion and the facts on which the opinions are based. 
[OPENING STATEMENTS BY COUNSEL]] 
[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED] 
22. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages, which 
contain instructions relating to the procedure that you should follow and the particular laws or 
rales that apply in this case. These additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-
two (22). We will now read those instructions. 
23. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss 
this case: 
a. All exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. Your notes (if any); 
c. Your copy of these instructions; and 
d. The verdict form or forms. 
24. NOTES 
The use of notes in the jury room to refresh your memory is perfectly acceptable. But let 
me caution you not to rely excessively upon your notes. You must arrive at a verdict 
independently, after consultation with the other jurors; and each of you must rely on your own 
memory of the evidence. One juror's opinion should not be given excessive consideration solely 
because that juror has taken notes. 
25. SELECTION OF JURY FOREPERSON AND DELIBERATION 
When you go into the jury room, your first task is to select a foreperson. The foreperson 
will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict form when it's completed. The 
foreperson should not dominate the discussions. The foreperson's opinions should be given the 
same weight as the opinions of the other jurors. 
After you select the foreperson you must discuss with one another - or deliberate - with a 
view to reaching an agreement. Your attitude and conduct during discussions are very important. 
As you begin your discussions, it is not helpful to say that your mind is already made up. 
Do not announce that you are determined to vote a certain way or that your mind cannot be 
changed. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after discussing the case with 
your fellow jurors. 
Do not hesitate to change your opinion when convinced that it is wrong. Likewise, you. 
should not surrender your honest convictions just to end the deliberations or to agree with other 
jurors. 
• 26. •, •
 : WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS. .DURING JIK1,1 UK K A' 1JI )N 
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to the 
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate. 
However, these instructions should contain all the information you need to reach a verdict based 
upon the evidence. 
27. FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE 
Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case as a 
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing individual or 
collective views about anything other than the issues you are called upon to decide. Your, verdict 
should reflect the facts as found by you applied to the law as explained in these instructions and 
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will 
contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a 
just and proper verdict. 
>S, IX > NOT SPECULATE ORRESORT TO CHANCE 
When you deliberate, do not flip a coin, speculate or choose one juror's opinions at 
random. Evaluate the evidence and come to a decision that is supported by the evidence. 
If you decide that a party is entitled to recover damages, you must then agree upon the 
amount of money to award that party. Each of you should state your own independent judgment 
on what the amount should be. You must thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, evaluate 
them according to these instructions and the evidence, and reach an agreement on the amount. 
You must not agree in advance to average the estimates. 
29. AGREEMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
I am going to give you a form called the Special Verdict that contains a single question. 
You must answer the question based upon the evidence you have seen and heard during this trial. 
Because this is not a criminal case, your verdict does not have to be unanimous. At least 
six jurors must agree on the answer to the question. 
As soon as six or more of you agree on the answer to the question, the foreperson should 
sign and date the verdict form and tell the bailiff you have finished. The bailiff will escort you 
back to this courtroom; you should bring the completed Special Verdict with you. 
30. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict to the court, I, or the clerk, may ask each of you about 
it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box and you may leave 
at any time. You may remain in the courtroom if you wish to watch the rest of the proceedings, 
which should be quite brief. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not 
required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you don't want to 
do that, please tell the court clerk or bailiff. 
31. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS 
This is a condemnation proceeding, commenced under the laws of the State of Utah for 
the purpose of condemning and acquiring private property of the defendant landowners for a 
public purpose. The party commencing this action, known as the plaintiff, is the Utah 
Department of Transportation, and the property owners, known as the defendants, are James 
Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services. The issues in this case include the value of 
the loss of view from the defendants' property. 
32. OWNER TESTIFYING 
The defendants have rendered an opinion as to the value of loss of view from their 
property. In considering the weight to be given to the defendants' testimony on the value of the 
loss of view from their property, you may consider the defendants' bias and personal 
involvement, the defendants' specific knowledge of the property, and the defendants' experience 
and qualifications to testify regarding land value. 
33. TAKING 
In this case, the condemnation or "taking" involves a parcel of land which was 
condemned as an essential component for the plaintiffs project to expand and elevate U.S. 
Highway 89 over Shepard Lane in Farmington, Utah. 
A property owner has a reasonable right of access to an adjacent public highway, and a 
reasonable right to receive air and light from an adjacent public highway and a view from their 
property. 
If you find that the fair market value of the remaining property is less in the "after 
condition" than the "before condition" because of a loss of view, then you may award damages 
based on the reduced value of the remaining property. This damage must be reasonably certain 
and not contingent, remote or speculative. 
A property owner adjoining a public highway has no right to be seen by passing traffic 
and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing 
traffic. 
34. LOSS OF VIEW 
In this case, it has already been determined that the defendants have a legal right to 
recover damages, if proved, for the loss of view. The loss of view is to be measured by the effect 
the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway structure, has upon the market^^re 
oftneTesidue of the property. ^^^mm— ^*mm 
it******* 
35. DAMAGES TO REAL PROPERTY PERMANENT INJURY 
The measure of damages for permanent injury to land is the difference in the fair market 
value of the land immediately before and after the injury. This is called "diminution in value." 
36. FAIR MARKET VALUE 
Fair market value is the highest probable price estimated in terms of money that land 
would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with a reasonable time allowed in which to 
find a buyer with knowledge of all the uses and purposes to which the land was adapted. 
In other words, "fair market value" means the amount a willing buyer would have paid a 
willing seller in an amis-length transaction with both parties being fully informed concerning all 
of the advantages and disadvantages to the property, and with neither acting under any 
compulsion to buy or sell. 
In this case you are to determine the fair market value of the loss of view from the 
defendants' property. 
37. BURDEN OF PROOF 
The defendants have the burden of proving the amount of damages for diminution in 
value of the subject property. 
38. COMPARABLE SALES 
Some of the witnesses have testified about sales of property similar to the property 
involved in this case. You may consider the price voluntarily paid for similar property under 
similar circumstances in helping you determine the value of the loss of view from the defendants' 
property in this case. Comparable sales are factors to be considered but are not the sole basis in 
determining fair market value of the property in dispute. 
39. JUST COMPENSATION 
The plaintiff has the right to condemn and take the defendants' property because of public 
necessity. In this case, just compensation must be paid for the value of the loss of view from the 
defendants' property. Just compensation includes the fair market value of the loss of view from 
the defendants' property. 
40. COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES 
In arriving at your verdict, you shall fix the just compensation to be paid to the defendants 
in the following manner: You will decide the value of the loss of view from the defendants' 
property by determining the fair market value as of December 30, 2002. 
41. INTEREST 
You are not to consider interest in assessing the value of the defendants' property, nor add 
it to the compensation you award. I will compute and add such interest to the compensation 
assessed by you. You are not to consider any costs of these proceedings since any such costs will 
be dealt with by me in accordance with the law. 
42. LOSS OF PROFITS 
In arriving at your determination of fair market value of the subject property, you shall 
not consider alleged injury to any business or business operation conducted on or about the 
dependants' property as of the date of condemnation as a separate element of recoverable 
damages. Nor should you consider any claim for loss of profit or income from any business 
operation caused by the condemnation of the land and improvements for the public use as a 
separate element of recoverable damages. The plaintiff in this action must pay to the defendant 
the fair market value of the property being acquired, which has occurred but for the defendants' 
loss of view from the property. Such factors as claimed damage to business operations or loss of 
profits are not recoverable, but may be considered as bearing upon establishing the market value 
of the subject property. 
43. HIGHEST AND BEST USE 
The defendants are entitled to just compensation based upon the highest and best use for 
which the property was reasonably adapted on the date of taking, without limitation to the use 
that was actually made of the property. The highest and best use means its most advantageous 
and valuable use, having due regard to the existing conditions and reasonable needs or wants of 
the community, including such needs or wants as may probably be expected in the reasonably 
foreseeable future. The term "probably" means that the property would more likely than not be 
put to a particular use except for the taking. 
An owner may show present or future uses which are sufficiently practicable and 
probable as to likely influence the price which an informed purchaser would have given for the 
property at the time of the taking. The uses which may be considered must be so reasonably 
probable as to have an effect on the fair market value of the land at the time of taking. A purely 
imaginative or speculative use cannot be considered. 
In deteimining highest and best use, you may take into consideration: (1) the actual use of 
the property at the date fixed for evaluation; (2) its location; (3) its topography; (4) the use of the 
surrounding properties, both past and present; (5) the zoning of the property at the time in 
question, or the lack thereof; (6) the availability of water and utility facilities as of that time; (7) 
market conditions in the general vicinity; (8) the supply and demand for comparable property in 
the general area; and (9) any other factors which you believe the informed and willing buyer and 
seller would take into account in fixing the probable use of the subject property as of December 
30, 2002, or within the reasonably foreseeable future. 
44 ACCESS 
You are instructed that the use of the highways and streets may be limited, controlled and 
regulated by the exercise of the police power to the extent necessaiy to promote the health, safety 
and welfare of the public. However, the right to enter and leave a person's land cannot be entirely 
cut off. Free and convenient access shall be provided to an owner who had free and convenient 
access prior to the enactment of the regulation. 
45. SPECULATIVE COMPENSATION 
In determining just compensation, you are not to take into consideration imaginative or 
speculative values or damages. You are not to consider the price for which the property would 
sell under special or extraordinary circumstances, but only such values that are real and supported 
by the evidence. 
46. VIEWING OF PROPERTY 
You may use any information or knowledge obtained by you while viewing the property 
in this case only for the purpose of determining the weight and applicability of the testimony and 
evidence introduced in this trial. 
Your view of the property is not evidence, in and of itself, upon which a verdict may be 
based. You may use it only to aid you in better understanding the testimony of the witnesses. 
47. SYMPATHY OR ANIMOSITY NOT TO BE CONSIDERED 
The plaintiff has a legal right to condemn land under appropriate circumstances for the 
purpose of constructing public projects. You shall not assess compensation in favor of the 
defendant solely because the land may have been taken against the defendants' will. Rather, your 
verdict shall be limited to the fair market value of the loss of view from the defendants5 property. 
48. SETTLEMENT OF VALUE OF PROPERTY 
The parties have already reached agreement on the fair market value of the property taken 
for the highway construction. The landowner has already been fully paid this value. 
The purpose of this trial is to determine if the landowner is to receive any additional 
compensation for the value of the loss of view from their property. You are to determine that 
dollar value, if any. 
49. ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL NOT EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES 
You may consider the arguments of the attorneys to assist you in deciding the amounts of 
damages, but their arguments are not evidence. 
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Defendants (collectively referred to herein as "Arby's"), by and through counsel, hereby 
respectfully submit their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine and Motion 
to Strike Portions of J, Phillip Cook's Appraisal. 
INTRODUCTION 
Arby's has sustained severance damages as a result of Plaintiffs ("UDOT") construction 
project to elevate U.S, 89 over Shepard Lane in Farmington, Utah, After a lengthy appeals 
process, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled Axby's is entitled present evidence to a jury to 
support the severance damages claim. UDOT has attempted through various motions to preclude 
Arby's from recovering damages and has now produced an appraisal from J. Phillip Cook (the 
"Cook Appraisal"), where Cook opines Defendants have suffered absolutely no damages 
resulting from loss of view. Cook's opinion is based upon irrelevant hearsay and opinions from 
lay witnesses not qualified as experts. Additionally, Cook has failed to show the information he 
obtained from lay witnesses is of the type reasonably relied upon by real estate appraisers to 
form their conclusions- Further, the facts and data upon which Cook relies for his opinions have 
not been disclosed to Arby's. Relevant portions of the Cook Appraisal, entitled "Market 
Participant Interviews," pp. 51-55, are attached hereto as Exhibit "A." Cook should not be 
pennitted to testify at trial concerning opinions based upon hearsay and lay opinions. He should 
also be excluded from testifying based upon irrelevant data. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
COOK RELIES UPON INADMISSABLE HEARSAY 
Cook's Appraisal concludes Arby's loss of view has not negatively impacted the value of 
the subject real property. This opinion is based upon opinions from lay witnesses Cook or his 
assistants allegedly interviewed. Exhibit "A." This is problematic for numerous reasons. First, 
the product of these interviews clearly meets the definition of hearsay: out of court statements 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 801(c), UTAH R. EVID. Hearsay is generally 
2 
inadmissible. See Rule 802, UTAH R. EVID, Cook's interviews of lay witnesses do not meet any 
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule under Rule 803, UTAHR. EVID.1 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized, in a case where an expert witness based his 
opinion in part on out of court statements, "[t]he interjection of such hearsay testimony, cloaked 
in the form of an expert opinion, would have been impermissible and potentially highly 
prejudicial." Edwards v. Didericlcsen, 597 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Utah 1979). This hearsay evidence 
is clearly not admissible at trial. 
POINT 2 
LAY WITNESSES ARE NOT QUALIFIED AS EXPERTS 
While some of Cook's interviewees are named, many of them are not identified and are 
only referenced vaguely and generally For example, on page 51, Cook says he spoke with cthe 
managers of several fast-food restaurants,..." Exhibit "A". On page 52, he states: "We also 
interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site selection 
criteria and view out." Id. Cook identifies an alleged Wendy's representative, Russ Smith, but 
does not identify any of the other "managers for various fast-food chains" with whom he 
allegedly spoke. 
Moreover, insufficient information, is provided concerning the background and 
qualifications to give opinions about the impact of loss of view on the fair market value of the 
1
 The interview material is hearsay upon hearsay to the extent Cook relied upon other parties to 
conduct the interviews of lay witnesses and then incorporated that material into his Appraisal. It 
is also double hearsay to the extent interviewees merely passed along statements they allegedly 
heard from others. 
3 
subject real property. What are their job duties and backgrounds? Is the valuation of loss of 
view any part of their jo b duties? These individuals are apparently involved in. managing 
restaurants, but they are not real estate experts. For example, alleged statements of an individual 
named Treesa Kurtzenbom about the subject property is used to support Cook's opinion that 
Arby's suffered no damage. No information is given concerning Ms. Kurtzenbom's expertise or 
familiarity with the subject property, yet she freely speculates and opines that other factors 
impacted the value of the subject property more than the view obstruction. There is no 
foundation for such a speculative opinion from a lay witness and no explanation for why Cook 
would incorporate such a statement from a lay witness into his own expert analysis. This Court 
must insure that an expert witness is truly testifying as an expert and not merely serving as a 
conduit through which inadmissible hearsay is presented to the jury. United States v. Cormier, 
468 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir, 2006) ("an expert witness may not simply summarize the out-of-court 
statements of others as his testimony") (citation omitted). 
It is clear the lay witnesses Cook interviewed were asked to render opinions based upon 
scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. Rule 702, UTAH R, EVE), reserves such testimony 
to experts who have the requisite "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education." Id, 
None of Cook's interviewees has been designated a witness in this matter, expert or otherwise. 
Lay witness opinions are limited, pursuant to Rule 701, UTAH R, EVID., to the witness's own 
perception, rather than scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. The alleged opinions of 
Cook's interviewees goes well beyond permitted opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
4 
Defendants have not been able to conduct discovery or cross-examine the individuals 
Cook interviewed in order to test their evidence. Defendants should be given the opportunity to 
draw out anything which would tend to contradict, weaken, modify or explain the lay witness 
opinions. It would be blatantly prejudicial to simply permit Cook to pass this untested and 
unchallenged infoimation on to the jury. 
POINT 3 
THE LAY OPINIONS UPON WHICH COOK RELIES ARE IRRELEVANT 
There are serious problems with the relevance of Cook's interview data. As an example, 
Cook apparently interviewed an assistant store manager of the Smith's store and representatives 
of a Burger King on the east side of U.S. 89, across from the subject Arby's location. These 
locations are more distant from the elevated U.S. 89 than the Arby's property. The Smith's.store 
is further north than the Arby's property and does not face the highest point of the elevated U.S. 
89. Additionally, Cook fails to explain how the lack of customer complaints2 about loss of view 
at a grocery store (or other unrelated locations) has any bearing on determining the loss in the 
fair market value of the subject property. The Cook Appraisal is replete with this land of 
irrelevant material. 
2
 Cook relies upon the purported lack of customer complaints about view at locations other than 
subject location as a basis for his opinion that Arby's has suffered no damage for loss of view. 
Even if the lack of customer complaints at unrelated business had any relevance in this matter, 
Cook has laid no foundation to show that the persons interviewed would have been the persons 
to whom customers would have complained. 
5 
POINT 4 
TriE MATERIAL COOK RELIES UPON IS NOT OF THE TYPE AN APPRAISER 
REASONABLY BASES OPINIONS 
Rule 703, UTAH R. EVJD. states the data upon which an expert bases his opinion need not 
be admissible i n evidence if the data is "of a type reasoriiibly relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions...." Cook fails to explain that opinions of lay witnesses, 
particularly those who have no familiarity with the subject propei ty; are the type of facts 01 da ta 
upon which a licensed real estate appraiser would reasonably rely to value property. The 
material, whicli in no! ndinisaible doe to the pioblenis discussed above, is tun of [he type upon 
which an appraiser relies to appraise real property. Cook's opinions should be based upon the 
standard of R ule ' 702, UTAH R. EVID.3 rather .than memorialize .impermissible lay opinions. 
Therefore, it should be rejected,, and to the extent Cook has relied upon that information, he 
should be excluded from discussing it at trial. 
POINTS 
Not only does Cook fail to provide any foundation concerning the qualifications of the 
interviewees to render opinions, b tit he pro vi des no information about the methodology of the 
interview process: How were interviewees selected and qualified? How were the interviews 
conducted? How do the interviewees' properties compare to the subject propei ty with respect to 
the view issue? "What questions were asked? What is the identity of persons interviewed who 
are not discussed in th e Cook Appraisal? vV hat indi vidual's were interviewed who are not 
6 
mentioned in the report? What information was obtained through the interview process that 
contradicts Cook's opinions? What documentation or recordings exist of the interviews? 
Defendants have legitimate concerns about the selective nature of what is referenced in 
the Cook Appraisal and the identities, competency and qualifications of those who were 
interviewed. At a minimum, pursuant to Rule 705, UTAH R. EVE)., if for some reason the Court 
permits Cook to rely upon this data, all of the facts and data underlying Cook's opinions should 
be disclosed to Arby's prior to trial. 
POINT 6 
THE COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS FUNCTION AS GATEKEEPER 
With the concerns referenced above, Cook's opinion does not meet the standards required 
under Rule 702. That Rule, in relevant part, provides: 
(b) Scientific, technical or otherwise specialized knowledge may 
serve as the basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or 
other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a 
threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon 
sufficient facts or data, and (Hi) have been reliably applied to the 
facts of the case, 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is 
satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is 
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of 
their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by 
the relevant expert community. 
As noted in the Rule's Advisory Committee Note ("Note"), Rule 702, UTAH R EviD. is 
to be applied to "all expert testimony." The Note continues by explaining that, just as in federal 
court, this rule "assigns to trial judges a 'gatekeeper5 responsibility to screen out unreliable 
7 
expert testimony." To fulfill this role, the Note advises that the trial judge should "confront 
proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism" and should be "receptive to any plausible 
evidence that may bear on reliability." 
Because Cook relies upon irrelevant hearsay opinions from lay witnesses, his opinions 
are unreliable. Defendants submit the Court, acting as gatekeeper, should exclude such 
testimony and evidence at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, portions of J , Phillip Cook's .Appraisal should be stricken and he 
should not be permitted to express his opinions at trial based upon irrelevant hearsay and lay 
opinion. 
*ik pi DATED Ms/JO day of March, 2010 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
: J. Winder 
.W.Holt 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Exhibit "A" 
J 
SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES IVERS 
(ARBY'S RESTAURANT) 
Parcel Number 269 
Project No. STP-0067(1)0 
Located at 
±1253 North Highway 89 
Farmington, Davis County, Utah 
PREPARED FOR: 
STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEh ::l 
c/o Mr. Randy Hunter 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Submitted by: 
J. Philip Cook, MAI, CRE 
Director, and 
Richard SJoan, Appraiser 
LECG, LLC 
201 South Main Street, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FILE NUMBER: 10-03-01SL 
CASE NUMBER: jiver-25561 
EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL DATE: 
December 30,2002 
LeCG 
March 3,2010 
Mr. Randy Hunter 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Re: Appraisal: A partial taking of the view out properly right appurtenant to land owned 
by James Ivers, et al. (Arby's Restaurant), located'at ±1253 North Highway 89, 
Farmington, Davis County, Utah. Parcel No. 269 of Project No. STP-0067(1)0. 
Dear Mr. Hunter: 
As you know, on September 4, 2003, we provided an appraisal addressing market value of 
the taking of land and site improvements from the above-referenced property. That 
appraisal, which addressed the value of the property taken, severance damages and benefits, 
was the basis for negotiations that resulted in settling the majority of issues regarding the 
property owner's claim for compensation. Specifically, the parties have reached settlement 
on the value of the property actually taken and claimed severance damages relating to the 
taking of landscaping that left the property non-conforming relative to zoning. 
The Court has heard and ruled on the owner's claim that lost visibility/exposure and reduced 
accessibility from the highway have reduced the value of the properly. The Court ruled that 
properly owners have no appurtenant rights to exposure from fronting traffic and have 
appurtenant rights only to adequate access. The Court concluded that the subject's access in 
the after condition is reasonable. The Court also heard and ruled on the owner's claim that 
lost view out reduced value- of the property, its conclusion was that view, from a. property 
abutting a public road is an appurtenant right and, since construction of the government's 
project required the subject land and resulted in reduced view, damages related thereto 
must be addressed. 
This appraisal focuses on the single issue of severance damages, if any, resulting from the 
reduced view to the east due to UDOT's elevated reconstruction of U.S. Highway 89. It 
considers the subject net of land and site improvements taken, for which compensation has 
been paid. 
201 South Main, Suite 450, Sale Lake City, UT 84171 
main 801.364.6233 fax 801.364.6230 www.lecg.com 
Page Two 
As a summary appraisal report, this presents only summary discussion of the data, reasoning, 
and analyses that are used in the appraisal process to develop an opinion of value. The 
depth of discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client and for the 
intended use stated within this report. 
The report complies with the Utah Relocation Act and the Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal -Practice (USPAP) as promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation. 
The valuation date is December 30, 2002, which is the date of Service of Summons. After 
careful consideration and analysis of available information, we are of the opinion that market-
value of the subject is not negatively affected by the reduced view out Therefore, no 
compensation beyond that already paid for the taking and claimed severance damages for 
lost landscaping is concluded. 
This conclusion is subject to assumptions and limiting conditions contained in the report. 
We trust this is sufficient to accomplish its intended function. Please call if we can be of 
further assistance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
[J. Philip Cook, MAI CRE 
LECG, LLC, Director 
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11 
2u4w»jL <L $****<-< 
Richard C. Sloan 
LECG, LLC, Appraiser 
Utah State.- Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 5707759-CG00 Expires 11-30-11 
201 South Main, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
main 801.364.6233 fax 801.364.6230 www.Iecg.com 
LECG CERTIFICATION 
CERTIFICATION 
We certify that we have made an investigation and analysis of the following property: 
Property Owned by James Ivers, e t al. 
(Arby's Restaurant) 
Located at ±1253 North Highway 89 
Farmington, Davis County, Utah 
Davis County Assessor's Parcel No. 08-051-0097 
We certify that to the best of our knowledge and belief: 
5. 
6. 
7. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
The statements of fact contained in this report are true and correct 
The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions are limited only by the reported assumptions and limiting conditions and are our 
personal, impartial,'and unbiased professional analyses, opinions, arid conclusions, 
We have no present or prospective interest in the properly that is the subject of this report, and we have no personal interest with 
respect to the parties involved. 
We have no present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report and no personal interest with respect to 
the parties involved. 
We have no bias with respect to the properly that is the subject of this reporter to the parties involved with this assignment 
Our engagement in this assignment was not contingent upon developing.or reporting predetermined results. 
Our compensation for completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of a predetermined value or 
direction in value that favors the cause of the client, the amount of the value opinion, the attainment of a stipulated result, or the 
occurrence of a subsequent event directly related to the intended use of this appraisal. 
The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions were developed, and this report has been prepared in conformity with the 
requirements of the Code of Professional Ethics & Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice of the Appraisal institute, which 
include the Uniform Standards or" Professional Appraisal Practice* 
Weihave made an inspection of the property that is the subject of this report 
No one provided professional assistance in preparing this report 
J. Philip Cook has completed the requirements of the continuing education program of the Appraisal Institute. 
The value conclusion as well as other opinions- expressed herein are not based on a requested minimum valuation, a specific 
valuation, or the approval of a loan. 
Our state appraisal certifications have not been revoked, suspended, canceled, or restricted. 
The undersigned hereby acknowledge that they have the appropriate education and experience to complete the assignment in a 
competent manner. The reader is referred to the appraisers' Statement of Qualifications. 
J. Philip Cook is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5451057-CG0Q, 
Richard C. 5ban is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5707759-CG00 
Dated: March 3, 2010 
|J. Philip Cook, MAI CRE 
LECG, LLC, Director 
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11 
U*W<8AJL (L ^C^U^ 
Richard C. Sloan 
LECG, LLC, Appraiser 
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 5707759-CG00 Expires 11-30-11 
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f\ :f,:ij ket Participant Intei vie\ vs 
We interviewed the assistant store manager of Smith's Food and Drug and the owner of 
Burger King, which are located on the east side of Highway 89 across from the : ;i: •- -
Similar to the subject, both Smith's «*: ; : . .-»• } :ng \ave restrictec . !o:w-- .•••:s: d-.- .• *e 
Highway 89 overpass, althoi igh bor . - . _ (i'-tor* •'-"• -!v- overpass than the subject. 
Smith's assistant store manager, Dan Woodyatt, said that the lack of view out of the store 
was not an issue and that he was unaware of any complaints by customers due to the view. 
He said that business had increased 20 percent over the past year and 25 percent or more 
over the past two years. 
•-• ' - ail i Restai n ai its, wl io < .^ store said that 1 ie 
partner, .-i purchased the store in • - - construction of the 
overpass. He said that the view of the overpass from the restaurant had no bearing on the 
purchase of the property including the purchase price, iior did the ilewfy .constructed 
overpass have any impact in general. 
Adan :i ,1 law I c e s i i it) :» f i, M I to .1 i in :i I a ) t o i :i > i 1 io is assist!i i g i.i i i edevelopment of the 
nursery/greenhouse area of the Kmart located just west of the subject, said that no one cares 
what they are looking at once they get inside the building. Likewise, Nick Mason with CB 
Richard Ellis, said that view out is not an issue and what property users want is exposure. 
Mason, is currently listing a..pad.site.ior.sale..located.pear-the-680...North/lrl 5 .interchange..in.. 
Clearfield. The pad site abuts the freeway off-ramp v.':.»; ' - r.r; - . ~r ,-./ r;v ... » 
cross over 680 Noi th„ Mason said that irregi j l a i shape < ,i, he
 l( rarcel aifected the asking | nlct, 
but no consideration was given for the obstructed view out to the east by the freeway. 
We spoke with the managers of several fast-food restaurants, including the managers of 
Cad's Jr., McDonalds, and Arby's in Clearfield, Carl's Jr., Taco Bell and Arby's in Centerville, 
and KFC located in Salt Lake City along State Street All oftl iese fast-food restaurants ab it a 
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freeway overpass or raised freeway, with the view in at least one direction obstructed by the 
freeway. None of the managers interviewed reported any customer complaints regarding a 
limited view in one direction and none reported that the obstructed view affected business. 
Of particular note is the Clearfield Arby's, which has a similar site layout to the subject as the 
restaurant faces east with the raised freeway located across the street to the east The 
manager said that the raised freeway had no impact on the business as it was across the 
street She also said that customers could see the mountains to the east over the overpass. 
The regional manager for Arby' at this store, Matthew Martin, said that traffic and exposure-
were the important issues. Martin said that once the customers were inside the store it 
didn't really matter what the view was. 
The layout of the Arby's location in Clearfield, which was constructed around 1993, is 
similar to the layout of the subject. Joe Rich, the property's developer with Woodbury 
Corporation, said he does not remember view out being discussed in any way. He said that 
Woodbury would not have reduced the price because of the obstructed view. 
The property owner of the Clearfield Arby's, Treesa Kurtzeborn, said that the raised freeway 
was not a factor in her decision to purchase the building. She said that the freeway was both 
a positive and a negative, mentioning the increased exposure and proximity to an off-ramp 
as positives. She did not mention what the negatives were but said that the raised freeway 
was far enough away that it didn't hurt the property. Kurtzeborn said that in purchasing the 
.propeity-sheJooked more. at.what the .surrounding..d.eyelopment was..aad_th.eJype„of.draw 
the area would have. In reference to the subject Arby's, she said that the loss of Kmart 
would be a larger impact on the subject than the highway project as there is no longer a 
major draw to the center. 
Wendall Burt of Burt Brothers Tire, who leases the adjoining tire store to the north, 
purchased the subject in October 2009. According to Mr. Burt, his store has not been 
affected by the reduced view out Although his store was affected during construction, once 
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customers figured oi it how to use the interchange upon completion of construction; his 
business quickly recovered. This relates to access, visibility and exposure, and specifically 
not view out l\ir. Burt said he purchased the adjoining Arby's restaurant with the intent of 
expanding his store upon termination of the lease in 2017 . 
W e also interviewed the sites selection mat lagers for \ fm Ions fast -food chains concerning site 
selection criteria and view oul. RJISS Smith, the site selection manager for Wendy's, said that 
view is a plus, but the view must be really bad before it becomes a negative, such as looking 
at a garbage dump. With regards to the subject property, it is his opinion that the view is 
neutral. Smith said that the primary concerns are access and exposure, with demographics 
also playing a role, and lie woi fid I lave i to.probler n sitii ig a i estaurai it nea r at i overpass as it 
i i iay n lean bett 2i exposi it e. ! le i noted that the viev\ out from the Wendy's restaurant in 
Centerville is of a gas station to the north and other retail development to t h e west and east 
Smith also said that view-out may be an issue for a casual or fancy restaurant where patrons 
are sitting for an hour or more 
Lisa Shaw, the western region site selection manager with Can I' : that \ iew out is i ;tot 
an issue as lonjj <e it n. not bad, such as an adult entertainment establishment Shaw said 
that the main criteria considered in site selection relates to lot size, demographics, price, 
access, and visibility. She said that she tries to site the restaurants by other retailers or 
restaurants as she does not consider the store to be a draw by itself. Shaw said that if she 
can ..get .people in. the door, j£ really .doesn't matter ,w.h&^ store., ijithe.. 
case of Arby's, she said it is the loss of visibility from the road that hurts the most. Shaw 
referenced a store in I lew Mexico where an overpass was constructed in front of it 
Although access was unchanged, it was her opinion that the loss of exposure from the road 
hurt the business. 
We discussed site selection with Joe Langran, the western region site selection i nanagei for 
Arby's restaurants, ai id , vei e pi ovided vv it! i tl le Arby's site selection criteria (previously1 
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presented) by Lynn McDaniel with the corporate office. Arby's site selection criteria was 
discussed earlier. Langran added that he tries to find sites where there is energy with a mass 
of surrounding development, and tries to negotiate reciprocal parking. 
With regards to view, Langran said that view is a factor, albeit very minor. He said there are 
many locations that do not have great views and that customers aren't there to look at the 
view. According to Langran, customers are not interested in what they are looking at outthe 
window. He said while a view of the mountains may be nice, it is not critical. 
!n addition, Langran said that loss of exposure affects the impulse buyer which is roughly 20 
percent of the business. He said that office or residential customers that are either return or 
local customers are not affected by exposure as they know where the restaurant is located 
and know the back way into the property. 
For additional support, photographs of various properties with obstructed views in one or 
two directions, some of which were previously discussed, are presented in the addenda. 
The majority of th£se properties were built with the view obstruction already in place, and 
there is no evidence any of the properties' values were affected by the impaired view out 
Conclusion 
The* paired data analysis is quite "conclusive that'retail prope'rty'values'We'not irnp"acte"d 
negatively by the loss of view out this is also the overriding consensus among real estate 
agents, property owners, on-site manager, and site selection managers for national fast-food 
restaurants. On this basis, the loss of view out is not considered to reduce the subject's 
value. 
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PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES • 
(ARBY'S RESTAURANT) 
Parcel Number 269 
Project No. STP-0067(1)0 
Located at 
±1253 North Highway 89 
Farmrngton, Davis County, Utah 
PREPARED FOR: 
STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
c/o Mr. Randy Hunter 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Submitted by: 
J. Philip Cook, MAI, CRE 
Director, and 
Richard Sloan, Appraiser 
LECG, LLC 
201 South Main Street, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FILE NUMBER: 10-03-01SL 
CASE NUMBER: jiver-25561 
EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL DATE: 
December 30, 2002 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Jw day of March, 2010,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE PORTIONS OF J. PHILLIP COOK'S APPRAISAL REPORT to be emailed and 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Randy Hunter 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0874 
randyhunter@utah.gov 
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the distances. 
at the distances, on the average, are a 
bit shy of 200 feet? 
Yeah, 192 
wall. It's 
Okay. Is 
partial view 
Certainly 
s no — 
is what we measure from the store, itse 
about 65 feet from the property line to 
it reasonable to review — t 
impairment"? 
it's only a partial view imp 
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directions, but to 
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els overlooking the ocean, a 
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gh end homes in resort settings, a view 
h buyers will pay a premium. 
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either storage where 
outside walls, as well 
ing, and so they 
where they don't 
employees to be looking out the window while they're -
they're 
Q. 
to an in 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
working, for safety purposes. 
How about the view in, visib 
dustrial property? 
It can be. 
Why is that? 
don't 
want 
-- while 
ility; is that important 
Well, some industrial businesses are -- they' 
a what we call a "showroom warehouse. 
construe 
like to 
tion materials companies like 
advertise and get people into 
are actually selling wholesale to the 
homeowner's picking out the goods. S 
to, say, a freeway or something, and 
can help their business. 
Q. Is it customary for them to 
some advertising on the outside of th 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Does that contribute -- that 
an industrial property? 
A. 
hopeful 
" So like a lot 
11 have 
of home 
tile companies will 
their showroom. They 
contractors, but the 
o if they can be exposed 
have that visibility, that 
put some — their name or 
e building? 
visibility contribute to 
An industrial user that is worried about -- or is 
to get some recognition from the marketplace, that's 
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1 exactly what they want to do. 
2 Q. It provides some name recognition? 
3 A. Right, but there are a lot of industrial users that 
4 don't care. This is sort of a unique little group of industrial 
5 users where there's some advantage to that disability. 
6 Q. So the visibility in is different than the visibility 
7 out; is that what you're saying? 
8 A. Significantly. 
9 Q. Okay, how about fast food restaurants; is view out an 
10 important amenity to a fast food restaurant? 
11 A.. It is not. It wasn't listed in the criteria of site 
12 selection for fast food operators. It wasn't something that in 
13 my varied discussions with individuals who are involved in that 
14 business identified as an issue. I've also studied it with 
15 specific paired sales suggested is not an amenity that fast 
16 food restaurants care about. 
17 Q. Where are fast food restaurants typically located? 
18 A. They are typically located along freeway interchanges 
19 or in front of shopping centers. Ideally, both. 
20 Q. Is that for their convenience? 
21 A. Right, it's for convenience, it's for visibility, it's 
22 for accessibility. 
23 Q. I believe you said fast food restaurants are frequently 
24 located at highway/freeway intersections. 
25 A. They are. 
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Q. Why is this data collection process so important to an 
MAI appraiser? 
A. You know, appraisers are paid for their opinions, but 
their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base 
their opinion. We have a standards obligation, an ethical 
obligation to provide appraisal work in a non --
Q. Want to pull the microphone back towards --
A. -- in a non-misleading way, and to prove our -- prove 
our opinions. Not just to pull something out of the air, but 
to actually prove our opinions. Even though there's a lot of 
anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not 
something these fast food operators particularly care about, 
we need to go to the market to confirm that. 
Q. So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in 
forming your opinions? 
A. Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my 
sole reliance. 
Q. Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case 
studies ? 
A. That I cannot is -- I cannot find in the marketplace 
where this changed the subject's situation, specifically 
related to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding 
accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which 
I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court, 
that just this view impairment has no impact on market value. 
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-42-
That's the conclusion of your data? 
Yes. 
Is that supported by your other research? 
It is. 
Does it surprise you that you couldn't find any value 
for that view out? 
A. 
Q. 
' A. 
; that --
It doesn't. 
Why is that? 
Because of how common it is in this imperfect world 
- that view impairment, especially in situations next to 
the highway, where you're trying to attract highway business, 
how common that is, and why a business would locate in that 
situation if it were — if it were that critical of a factor. 
So I'm 
Q. 
not surprised by the results. 
Now, I've asked you to look at a book by Misters 
1 Bell and Oral Anderson, published by the American -- or the 
Appraisal Institute, titled "Real Estate Damages." Have you 
looked 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
second 
A. 
Q. 
at that book? 
Yes. 
You're familiar with that book? 
I am 
In fact, I had the first edition, and you gave me the 
edition; is that right? 
Yes. 
A newer mod -- newer version of it. Is this approach 
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Yes. 
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, that research, what was your conclusion 
I couldn't isolate or prove or identify 
upon 
? 
any 
that 
value, 1 
ue diminution related to this partial view impairment 
east, or this fast food restaurant property. 
MR. HUNTER: Thank you. Your Honor, mi 
moment? 
THE COURT: Please. 
(Discussion at the bench off the recor< 
BY MR. HUNTER: So just to conclude, it 
fessional opinion that the view out from the 
taurant has no monetary value? 
A. 
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Thank you. If you can stay, because we're 
o review some of these, if that's okay? 
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I don't know how you got that set up. 
you. Thank you. 
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t h a t kind of s i t u a t i o n ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right, it could be as individuals. If we wanted 
to go vacation in San Francisco, we might be willing to pay 
more to look at the Golden Gate Bridge or the -- or the bay 
than something else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. So a buyer, renter or tenant in these 
situations may pay more for a view? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Our disagreement, Mr. Cook, in this case, is with the 
ultimate issue. That is, does the impairment of view that's 
been lost by the Arby's operation, did they suffer any damage 
because of it. That's our difference. 
A. Yes, that's why we're here. 
Q. That's why we're here, okay. Now, let's talk about 
some of these — and I'm sorry, I — a copy of the slides that 
I got had two on each, and I have page numbers different than 
yours. In purple and at my age, there's -- I'm sorry, there's 
no way I can read that, but if --
A. If you tell me what it is, then I'll --
Q. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. So let's --
let's review some of these slides, and talk about them. I'm on 
page 28, and I think it's the Einstein's Bagel. My copies are 
teeny, tiny. We had it there, yeah. Good. I can't read the 
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